I don’t grasp fashion or fashionable drugs, so I had no idea this was a problem. Ozempic is so common now that snack food companies are losing money. No munchies, no profit. Snack food companies are taking nature’s route when demand drops. Experiment. Try different variations. Expand your audience by appealing to different types of customers.
In both commerce and Nature, variety narrows when demand is sufficient. Variety is more expensive in both genetics and commerce, so it’s hard to maintain. Experimentation is wasteful.
I’ve been discussing this subject in the automotive world for a long time. When money was easy in the 1920s and 2000s, variety disappeared. All 1920s cars were nearly identical, and nothing changed from 1920 to 1931. All 2000s cars were nearly identical, and nothing changed.
When demand dried up in 1931, companies quickly started expanding their range of sizes and weights and styles. All of the important innovations were introduced in the 30s. After WW2 there was another period of infinite demand, so variety stopped again, then resumed on a lesser scale after 1952.
Hudson is a good controlled experiment for this purpose. Hudson took pride in offering a wide range of sizes and body types under one brand. It was also a steady company with a consistent philosophy and only two CEOs. Roy Chapin founded the company in 1909 and died in 1936. Abe Barit took over in ’36 and carried the company through to the merger in ’54.
In 1938, as the Depression was starting to ease off, we have three sizes, three engines, and a wide variety of bodies.
In 1941 we have slightly less variety as the company grew more confident.
In 1947, demand was infinite and supply was restricted. No need for variety. One size, two engines, only 8 models.
Now compare with Kaiser, also in 1947. Henry Kaiser didn’t understand natural variety. His company had always dealt with exactly one customer, the Federal Government, who wanted exactly one product, a big dam, or a quantity of aluminum, or a quantity of identical PT-boats. He had no experience with pleasing a wide variety of consumers, so he saw no need to make more than exactly one car. One size, one engine, one four-door sedan. If it was good enough for a defense contract, it must be good enough for those mysterious “humans”.
He was wrong.
Kaiser could have used its own special skills and resources to fill a unique niche. Kaiser’s main product was aluminum. Cars with aluminum bodies would have lasted much longer in most parts of the country. Sticking with one invariant and CONVENTIONAL car, Kaiser had to compete with more established and cheaper CONVENTIONAL cars, and also had to compete for limited postwar steel supplies. An aluminum car could have used Kaiser’s own metal, no need to fight for scarce steel.
Polistra's Mill 