One phrase in Henry Wallace’s speech on the Red Menace wants more explanation. He called Herbert Hoover the Engineer of the Great Depression, and observed that Hoover was part of the cabal who were engineering the permanent Red Menace in 1948.
Conventional history says that Hoover was a ‘fall guy’ for Wall Street, accidentally allowing them to destroy the country for profit. Hoover was unquestionably a globalist, not a localist, but he didn’t have the reputation of a Wall Street type.
I looked through two of Wallace’s little books and didn’t find any further elucidation. I did find an answer to another puzzle. Several years ago while perusing old electronics mags, I noticed a sharp change in our attitude toward secrecy between 1945 and 1946. Immediately after VJ day, the magazine called Electronics published a nearly complete guide to making an a-bomb. This happened only once, and the whole subject was locked down after that. The switch definitely matched the timeline of Deepstate’s zombie resurgence from the richly deserved grave, but I didn’t know the mechanism of the switch.
Wallace explains the mechanism.
Semiquoting from his little book ‘Toward World Peace’. Wallace was sec of commerce at the time, a position granted him as consolation for losing the VP to Truman.
= = = = = START SEMIQUOTE:
I became worried about our stand against Russia when I listened to the first discussion of the A-bomb in cabinet. Sec State Stimson had a truly statesmanlike attitude, expressed in forthright language, but his view did not prevail.
Stimson was opposed to the policy of keeping atomic energy from the world, within the narrow confines of our military secrecy. As a matter of fact, he told us, we couldn’t keep it a secret anyhow**. There was nothing to be lost and much to be gained by imparting it to all nations.
After he left, the cabinet was more and more heavily loaded by the Russia-haters. As sec of commerce I was aware of the fact that many big business men who had cooperated with the military during the war were looking ahead to the inevitability of war with Russia. They looked with favor on large appropriations for military purposes.
These Men Of Monopoly welcomed the thought of higher taxes in order to get the nation in trim to fight Russia. [Insertion: This view appears constantly in those Industry On Parade films.]
Soon the press was cultivating the same Red hysteria that arose after the last war.
I put my thoughts into a letter to Truman in July 46. I urged him to develop practical plans for US and Russia to live in the same world without danger of nuclear warfare.
What caused my resignation was certain sentences in my Sept 12 speech, which had been cleared face to face with Truman beforehand. These sentences disturbed Byrnes and Vandenberg, not because I said them, but because Truman said at a press conference that he had read my speech and approved it.
The key sentences:
The real peace treaty we need now is between US and Russia. We should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, western Europe and the US.
We have to recognize that the Balkans are closer to Russia than to us, and that Russia cannot permit either England or US to dominate the politics of that area.
= = = = = END SEMIQUOTE.
Truman might have wanted to approve but he was thoroughly dominated by the Men Of Monopoly. Wallace made an even stronger speech in London around the same time, which was the last straw for the Men Of Monopoly. They threatened to prosecute him under the Logan Act. They later grilled him in Congress for the made-up crime of helping Russia during the war when Russia was our official ally.
Here’s part of the London speech:
= = = = = START SPEECH:
Tonight I want to talk about peace and how to get peace. Never have the common people of all lands so longed for peace. Yet, never in a time of comparative peace have they feared war so much. . . .During the past year or so, the significance of peace has been increased immeasurably by the atomic bomb, guided missiles and airplanes which soon will travel as fast as sound. . . . We cannot rest in the assurance that we invented the atom bomb—and therefore that this agent of destruction will work best for us. He who trusts in the atom bomb will sooner or later perish by the atom bomb—or something worse. . . .
To achieve lasting peace, we must study in detail just how the Russian character was formed—by invasions of Tartars, Mongols, Germans, Poles, Swedes, and French; by the czarist rule based on ignorance, fear and force; by the intervention of the British, French and Americans in Russian affairs from 1919-1921; by the geography of the huge Russian land mass situated strategically between Europe and Asia; and by the vitality derived from the rich Russian soil and the strenuous Russian climate. Add to all this the tremendous emotional power which Marxism and Leninism gives to the Russian leaders—and then we can realize that we are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a ‘Get tough with Russia’ policy. ‘Getting tough’ never brought anything real and lasting—whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get. . . .
We most earnestly want peace with Russia—but we want to be met half way. We want cooperation. And I believe that we can get cooperation once Russia understands that our primary objective is neither saving the British Empire nor purchasing oil in the Near East with the lives of American soldiers. . . .
= = = = = END SPEECH.
Of course we didn’t take Wallace’s advice or Stimson’s advice. We’ve been committing maximum evil for 78 years now. Russia hasn’t changed. Its position has been the same since 1812, trying to survive while under constant attack and invasion by US/EU/UK and Japan.
= = = = =
** Couldn’t keep it a secret anyhow: This is crucial. Russia had at least one spy at Los Alamos, and since Russia WAS OUR ALLY, we were officially sharing a lot of information and devices with them. Russia already knew the principles and methods, so the secrecy was pointless. The real difficulty of atomic power isn’t the theories or math, it’s the extremely long and expensive process of purifying uranium. We mastered it because we were the best at long complex manufacturing processes. Our non-secret industrial mastery came from our SYSTEMS AND METHODS, not our inventors and scientists. Now we’ve surrendered our SYSTEMS AND METHODS to China, first by inviting their spies and then by handing our entire economy to China.
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